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Managing Stakeholder Dialogue: The Case of Botnia in 
Uruguay 
Anna Heikkinen, Johanna Kujala,  and Hanna Lehtimäki 
 
Abstract 
Stakeholder dialogue is an effective way for a company to enhance its sensitivity to 
the operational environment and to increase stakeholders’ understandings of the 
dilemmas facing the company. An open and transparent dialogue process can create 
fertile ground for solving tensions in stakeholder relations. However, the process is 
not always straightforward. This article presents a case where a Finnish forest 
industry company’s decision to build a pulp mill in Uruguay raised both opposing and 
supporting views among the local interest groups. The company faced the challenge 
of how to engage with the hostile, opposing groups in order to ensure their 
operations in Uruguay. By engaging in this case, students will deepen their 
understanding of the multitude of stakeholder interests and learn to facilitate a 
dialogue that seeks to find solutions and avoid conflict in a situation of a stakeholder 
dispute.  
Keywords 
Stakeholder relationships, stakeholder dialogue, multinational business, foreign 
investment, conflict 
Disclaimer: This case as developed by Anna Heikkinen, Johanna Kujala,  and Hanna Lehtimäki    is a 
revised and updated version of the  case titled ‘Stakeholder Dialogue: MNE Green Field Investment in 
Uruguay’    as  presented  by  the  authors    at  International  Conference  on  Management  Cases 
(ICMC2012) held on November29‐30, 2012 at Bimtech Campus, Greater Noida, India. 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 The case has been developed solely as the basis for class discussion, for educational and 
management development programmes and is not intended to illustrate either effective or 
ineffective handling of an administrative situation or to present successful or unsuccessful  
managerial decision making or endorse the views of management in decision making. This 
study uses secondary data (news reports and information available on the company websites) 
and the sources have been cited in this case.  
 
 
Introduction 
The values affecting corporations are increasingly pluralistic, and the political and 
ethical responsibilities are increasingly pressed upon corporations (Calvano, 2008; 
Burchell & Cook, 2008). Multinational enterprises (MNEs) face growing challenges in 
managing the complexity and intensity of interactions across local and global 
contexts (Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). Recent research on MNEs questions 
the established argument that superior performance can be obtained by 
implementing centralized global strategies, and it further claims that a deep 
understanding of local context is a necessary requirement for success (Ghemawat, 
2007). To sustain a competitive advantage in a complex business environment, firms 
are required to exercise competitive imagination and to reconcile the perspectives of 
diverse, dispersed, and even adversarial actors (Hart & Sharma, 2004).  
The stakeholder view can be used to better understand the pluralism of international 
business. Stakeholder theory defines and explores important stakeholders, and it 
analyzes the nature of stakeholder relationships, firm-stakeholder interaction 
processes, and the outcomes of these relationships to organizations and their 
stakeholders (e.g. Freeman & Evan, 1990; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007; Jones 
& Wicks, 1999; Mitchell, Agle & Wood., 1997; Rowley, 1997; Savage et al., 1991). 
Research on stakeholders has argued that companies face webs of multiple 
stakeholder demands rather than individual demands (Rowley, 1997), in which 
stakeholders may cooperate with other stakeholders in order to influence companies. 
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In such a situation, it is important to understand the multitude of stakeholder interests 
and learn to facilitate a dialogue that seeks to find solutions and avoid conflict.   
In recent stakeholder literature, much effort has been placed on understanding 
stakeholder dialogue (Burchell & Cook, 2006, 2008; Kaptein & Van Tulder, 2003; van 
de Kerkhof, 2006; O’Riordan & Fairbrass, 2008; Pedersen, 2006). Stakeholder 
dialogue aims to develop trust between stakeholders and the company. In an open 
and transparent dialogue process, opinions are exchanged and interests and 
expectations are discussed so that the company can enhance its sensitivity to the 
operational environment and increase the stakeholders’ understandings of the 
dilemmas facing the company (Kaptein & Van Tulder, 2003). Open and trusting 
relationships can have indirect long-term effects on the ways companies and 
stakeholders approach joint problems and solve issues (Burchell & Cook, 2008). 
Such relationships can also help solve tensions between actors.  
Dialogue is not just about informing the stakeholders; rather, it is a mutual process in 
which all parties engage. Key to successful dialogue is openness and willingness to 
consider alternative viewpoints (Burchell & Cook, 2008). In addition, stakeholder 
dialogue should be planned, and the participants’ expectations should be managed 
so that the dialogue aims are realistic (Burchell & Cook, 2008). Poor planning can 
impair relationships if the stakeholders feel ignored or abused, or if meetings turn out 
to be different from what the participants expected. 
The Case 
The case presents a situation where a Finnish forest industry company, Metsä-Botnia 
Ltd (hereafter Botnia), faced wide-ranging opposition to building a pulp mill in 
Uruguay and was caught in the crossfire of a heated debate between two countries, 
Uruguay and Argentina. The situation erupted when Botnia decided to build a major 
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pulp mill in the city of Fray Bentos by the Uruguay River in Western Uruguay. Before 
the investment decision in 2003–2004, Botnia had examined the possibilities for 
starting pulp production in Uruguay. The company carried out studies assessing the 
prospective environmental and social impacts of the mill, arranged conferences and 
meetings for the media, local communities and NGOs, invited Uruguayan reporters 
and politicians to visit Finland, and held local information dissemination sessions in 
both Uruguay and Argentina. Despite Botnia’s efforts to ensure the project’s smooth 
progress, a disagreement arose regarding the mill’s location. The Argentine 
government and local people on the Argentinian side of the Uruguay River voiced 
environmental concerns related to the pollution of the river and to the negative impact 
on tourism. The dispute began as a disagreement between Uruguay and Argentina. 
Soon, however, it was politicized into an open conflict between the two nations. The 
conflict also erupted into a public issue that attracted various sets of stakeholders, 
including civic and environmental organizations, local people, workers, financiers, 
and the governments of Uruguay, Argentina, and Finland. Figure 1 presents the 
timeline of the conflict’s main events. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Timeline of the main events of the case 
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Key Stakeholders 
Botnia 
The Finnish forest industry group Metsä-Botnia Ltd is Europe’s second biggest 
manufacturer of chemical pulp, with an annual production capacity of 2.4 million 
tonnes of bleached softwood and hardwood pulps. The pulp products are used to 
manufacture magazine paper, fine paper, board and tissue. The company was 
founded in 1973 and owned four pulp mills located in Finland and one sawmill in 
Russia before their investment in Uruguay. In 2004, the company had approximately 
2,000 employees and a turnover of over EUR 1 billion.  
In 2003, Botnia set up a company called Botnia S.A. to investigate prospects for 
starting pulp production in Uruguay and to later implement the pulp mill project. In 
2003, the cost of the investment was estimated USD 1.1 billion (EUR 830 million), 
and the planned annual capacity of the mill was 1 million tonnes of bleached 
eucalyptus pulp. In addition, their other Uruguay-based subsidiary, Compaña 
Forestal Oriental S.A. (FOSA), specializes in eucalyptus plantations. In 2005, the 
company owned 90,000 hectares of land and forest areas in Uruguay, of which 40 
per cent was preserved as pastures and sanctuaries. FOSA’s plantations have 
received the FSC (Forest Stewardship Council) certification.  
 
Uruguayan Government 
The Uruguayan government welcomed the pulp mill investment, as it was estimated 
to boost the country’s gross national product (GNP) by more than USD 200 million a 
year, accounting for 1.6 per cent of Uruguay’s GNP. The mill was estimated to 
employ about 300 people and to provide direct or indirect jobs for approximately 
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8,000 people. Uruguay granted the mill free-trade-zone status in 2004 for 30 years, 
during which time the company would not pay taxes to the government. Uruguay and 
Argentina had signed a bilateral agreement, the 1975 Uruguay River Statute, to 
protect the use of the Uruguay River. The statute required both parties to agree on 
any issue concerning the river. 
 
Argentine Government 
The Argentine government opposed the mill, claiming that it would cause 
environmental damage. Further, it claimed that Uruguay had violated the Uruguay 
River Statute by allowing Botnia to build the mill by the river without asking 
Argentina’s permission.  
 
The Argentinian Citizens Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú (CEAG) 
The city of Gualeguaychú lies on the Argentinian side of the Uruguay River, 50 
kilometres from the pulp mill. In 2002, citizens of Gualeguaychú founded an 
environmental organization, The Argentinian Citizens Environmental Assembly of 
Gualeguaychú (CEAG), to oppose the plans of the Spanish Grupo Empresarial Ence 
SA (Ence) to build a pulp mill in Fray Bentos, Uruguay. The members of CEAG 
travelled to Spain where they witnessed the environmental problems of a local pulp 
mill. When Botnia announced its plans to build a mill in Fray Bentos, the group was 
prepared to take action. The members organized massive demonstrations against 
the pulp mill, claiming that the mill would, among other things, pollute the river, 
contaminate the soil, and ruin the tourism business in the area. In 2006, Ence 
decided to build the mill in another location in Uruguay, but the opposition for the 
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mills was already in full speed. CEAG gained the open support of many Argentine 
politicians; some of them even participated in the demonstrations.  
 
Events of the Pulp Mill Project 
2003–2004: Background of the Investment Decision 
In Finland, the forest industry has traditionally provided steady employment, 
especially in rural areas, and entire towns have grown to surround pulp and paper 
mills. During the past decade, the industry has been struggling with declining sales 
and increasing production costs. The remedy has been to divest operations in 
Finland and to look for new opportunities in Latin America and Asia. As a result, the 
industry has faced criticism in Finland due to closures of entire mills and the resulting 
massive lay-offs.  
Botnia has a long history, growing from a single mill company to a significant and a 
well-known multinational company. Over the years, Botnia has invested in 
environmental protection. The company has developed the protection of waterways, 
and, at the end of 1980s, it decided to develop a chlorine free bleaching process, 
which replaced gaseous chlorine with oxygen compounds.  
Prior to the investment decision, from 2003 to 2004 Botnia had completed studies on 
initiating pulp production in Uruguay and on the environmental and social impacts of 
the proposed mill. The studies included interviews with local people in Uruguay who 
were mostly in favour of the project for the economic benefits and the prospective 
jobs, although they were also concerned about the local environment.  
The results of the environmental impact assessment stated that the pulp mill would 
have little noticeable effect on the immediate environment or on the quality of water 
in the Uruguay River. Moreover, it would not affect the health of fish, algae or people. 
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The only noticeable changes would be related to the landscape, occasional odour 
problems, and increased traffic during the construction and start-up phases. The 
results of the socio-economic survey showed that the pulp mill project would have a 
substantial impact on the Uruguayan economy and would directly or indirectly 
provide jobs for about 8,000 people. The company engaged with and informed local 
stakeholders and the media, and the project received considerable publicity both in 
Finland and in Uruguay. 
In February 2005, Uruguay’s environmental authority granted an environmental 
permit for the pulp mill project. In March 2005, the investment decision was finalized. 
The project was funded through capital investments and external loans. The World 
Bank provided Botnia a EUR 55 million credit and securities for, inter alia, political 
risks. 
A number of reasons favoured the choice of Uruguay, and specifically the city of Fray 
Bentos, to be the site for the pulp mill. The company’s customers required eucalyptus 
pulp to maintain and to improve the quality and competitiveness of their fine paper 
products. The fast-growing eucalyptus is affordable in Uruguay, where pasturelands 
have been turned into eucalyptus plantations and trees have been planted since the 
1980s with the support of the World Bank and the Uruguayan government. The city 
of Fray Bentos is closely situated to large eucalyptus plantations. Annually, the mill 
will use 3.5 million cubic metres of wood. The majority of this wood will be supplied 
from FOSA’s plantations and the remaining 40 per cent of the wood will be 
purchased through long-term contracts from private forest owners, funds, foundations 
or cooperatives. In addition, Uruguay’s well-developed legislation, political stability 
and clear land ownership rights influenced the investment decision.  
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When the project was kicked off, Botnia expected the pulp mill to start operating in 
autumn 2007 and estimated that the total cost of the project would be USD 1.1 
billion. Thus, the pulp mill project was going to be the biggest Finnish private sector 
foreign industrial investment and the biggest industrial investment in the history of 
Uruguay.  
 
2005: Project Launch Facing Headwind,Construction Work Begins, First Signs 
of Opposition  
The construction work began in September 2005. The citizens of Fray Bentos 
welcomed the prospective jobs:   
‘People need jobs and it doesn’t matter if the mill pollutes a bit,’ stated Maria Acuna. ‘My only 
fear is that the builders bring machinery and employees from other parts of Uruguay, and no 
work is available for local people.’ Maria Acuna would welcome a job at the mill, but she was 
not sure of her qualifications. ‘I don’t know if I would be qualified. I don’t have any vocational 
training.’  
According to Luis Gutierrez, who worked as a scavenger, it was ‘perfect’ that a massive mill 
was being built uptown: ‘People do a lot of odd jobs here, and permanent jobs are welcome.’ 
(Iivonen, 2005a) 
Environmental and civic organizations such as Greenpeace and the local CEAG 
opposed the project from the day one. Greenpeace demonstrated at the mill, 
claiming that the construction was illegal under the conditions of the Uruguay River 
Statute. They criticized the company for polluting the environment and demanded 
that the mill be relocated to an area where it would not harm local livelihoods. 
Similarly, Argentines feared that the mill would pollute the river, foul the area, and 
ruin the tourism business. The first anti-pulp mill protests on the border bridge were 
already organized in spring 2005. In autumn, a massive protest brought together 
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15,000 people to oppose the pulp mill. The protest was called Grito Blanco (White 
Cry) because of the participating students’ white uniforms, and it was one of the first 
events to receive international media attention. The protestors also set up roadblocks 
on the border bridge. The first protest at the Finnish Embassy in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina was organized in December 2005. These protestors sought to appeal to 
the decision-makers emotions: 
 
‘We do not want death upon the Uruguay River. We demand the mills to be shut down 
immediately, for they will pollute our children’s future. This is a protest for peace, 
environment and life,’ states Gualeguaychúan Alejandro Gahan. (Pohjola, 2005).  
The Argentine protestors claimed that Botnia would use technology that was 
prohibited in Europe. The company felt that their efforts to provide information were 
unfruitful:  
Botnia has not been able to influence Argentines’ opinions even though the mill’s 
environmental impact assessment is a public document. ‘I doubt that anyone in Argentina 
has read it or that the general public has the faintest idea of this industry. And if they do, it is 
an image of the old industry,’ Varis [Botnia’s CEO] states. (Iivonen, 2005b)  
Quarrel Between Argentina and Uruguay 
The governments of Argentina and Uruguay disagreed about the pulp mill. Argentina 
criticized the environmental impact assessment conducted by Botnia and demanded 
the construction work to be suspended until a new environmental assessment was 
concluded. In addition, Argentina claimed that the Uruguayan government had not 
asked its permission to build the mill on the border river and had thus violated the 
Uruguay River Statute. When Argentina demanded the construction work of the mill 
to be suspended, Uruguay was stuck between a rock and a hard place: the 
continuation of the construction and operation of the mill would bring significant 
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economic benefits to the area and the country; however, Uruguay did not want to risk 
their long-standing relations with Argentina or harm the economy, as the roadblocks 
were inflicting significant losses – especially on their tourism industry. 
 
2006: The Storm Is Rising,Demands to Suspend the Construction 
During 2006, the quarrel between Uruguay and Argentina turned into a raging storm 
affecting various stakeholders. In January 2006, Argentina declared that it would take 
the case to The Hague International Court of Justice (ICJ), demanding the project to 
be suspended on the grounds that Uruguay violated the Uruguay River Statute. The 
court proceedings were closely followed by the international press and turned the 
conflict into an internationally notable issue. Botnia’s CEO commented on the court 
proceedings:  
 
‘Taking the dispute to The Hague was no surprise,’ says Metsä-Botnia’s CEO Erkki Varis. He 
emphasizes that Metsä-Botnia is not a party in the court case involving Argentina and 
Uruguay.   
Varis assesses that it is not very likely that the court should demand the construction work to 
be suspended.  
According to Varis the recent developments of the dispute may even ease the tense 
situation. ‘Acute quarrelling may decrease. Argentina has now removed the roadblocks 
because a process like this makes it difficult to perform illegal operations,’ Varis states. 
(Width, 2006)  
 
In March 2006, the presidents of Uruguay and Argentina agreed to appeal for a 90-
day moratorium on construction work until another new, independent environmental 
impact study had taken place. They also agreed that the roadblocks damaging the 
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Uruguayan economy and free movement of people and goods would be lifted. The 
employees and residents of Fray Bentos opposed the suspension and organized a 
demonstration in favour of the mill. 
In April, Botnia halted the works for ten days instead of the 90 days required by the 
presidents: 
 
With the purpose of contributing to opening a space for dialogue between the republics of 
Uruguay and Argentina and answering the requests made by Presidents Tabaré Vazquez 
and Nestor Kirchner, Botnia is willing to suspend, for a maximum period of 90 days, the 
installation of the pulp mill that is being built in the city of Fray Bentos, Department of Rio 
Negro, in Uruguay.  
The Uruguayan government has informed that in this period of time both countries will study 
the environmental impact that the mills could generate in the region. To facilitate this, the 
company will give all the information needed in order to clarify the doubts that might exist and 
to ensure the correct conditions of operation and control of the pulp mills. (Oy Metsä-Botnia 
Ab, 2006)  
 
The presidents had already agreed that they would negotiate during the moratorium, 
but as Botnia refused to cooperate, relations were broken off. In July 2006, The 
Hague ICJ ruled that there were no grounds for imposing suspension on the 
construction works. 
 
Demands for the Finnish Government to Intervene 
In spring 2006, the Argentine government requested the Finnish government to help 
to resolve the conflict. The government, however, responded that they would not 
intervene. The Finnish Minister of Foreign Trade and Development stated that 
 14 
Uruguay, Argentina and Botnia, as a private company, should resolve the conflict.  
Demonstrations were organized outside the Finnish Embassy in Buenos Aires, and 
the demonstrators called for Finland to bear its responsibility. In August 2006, the 
representatives of civic and environmental organizations visited Finland and 
delivered a petition of over 40,000 signatures from Gualeguaychú to the Finnish 
Minister of Foreign Trade and Development. The Minister reiterated that the Finnish 
government was not a party to the conflict.  
 
Influencing the IFC’s Decision-making Process 
The World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) had started an 
independent cumulative impact study of the mill in 2005, and the findings stated that 
the mill would not harm the environment. Argentina declared that the report was 
preliminary and inadequate, and the IFC embarked on another assessment. In 
response, Botnia publicly accused Argentina of delaying the financing decision. The 
members of CEAG endeavoured to influence the financing banks through 
demonstrations and roadblocks, as well as by writing letters to the banks.  
The final version of the environmental study was released in October 2006, and it 
stated that the pulp mill would not harm the environment, and that it would benefit the 
Uruguayan economy. In November, Botnia announced that it would utilize its know-
how to improve the quality of the water of the Uruguay River. The company stated 
that it would work together with relevant authorities and companies in Uruguay to 
enable the treatment of domestic sewage from the city of Fray Bentos in the mill’s 
effluent treatment plan.  
The pulp resistance movement gained momentum towards the end of 2006. The 
Argentine newspapers fuelled the opposition, and Uruguay prepared to prevent 
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terrorism at the mill even with military forces. CEAG had the support of Argentine 
society, companies and politicians; President Kirchner had even appointed the CEAG 
leader as the Argentine Minister of the Environment.  
In November 2006, despite continuing criticism from Argentina, the IFC and MIGA 
(Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) granted a USD 170 million loan and a 
USD 350 million guarantee for the project. The Argentine president responded by 
emphasizing that they would not prevent the roadblocks, which compelled Uruguay 
to take the case to The Hague ICJ. In December, the installation began at the mill 
and the number of workers peaked with 4,000 people.  
 
2007: Start-up in the Midst of Continuing Controversy 
In 2007, the annual carnival in Gualeguaychú was opened with dancers dressed in 
colourful ostrich feather costumes and carrying a poster with an anti-Botnia slogan. 
The Argentines could not understand why the mill was built by the beautiful river and 
near the border bridge, where it was constantly in sight. The citizens stated that they 
did not oppose the industry in general, only the location of the mill.  
In spring 2007, Argentina and Uruguay tried to resolve the conflict in negotiations led 
by the King of Spain. The Finnish government and Botnia were expected to 
participate, but as they refused, the negotiations ended unsuccessfully. At the same 
time, CEAG demanded that the construction work be suspended in order to maintain 
peace in the society, and stated that if the mill began its operations, CEAG would 
regard it as a declaration of war. A massive demonstration of over 100,000 
participants was organized in April 2007. The opposing stakeholders continued to set 
up roadblocks; some of them had been there for over four months. The Argentine 
police had even set up an office at the roadblock, but they did not try to remove it.   
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  In October, CEAG set up a fake website that they claimed was Botnia’s official 
website in Argentina. Botnia demanded the website to be shut down and sent 
lawyers after the group:  
 
‘It is an illegal act, because our logo cannot be used in such circumstances,’ stated Metsä-
Botnia’s CEO Varis.  
Varis characterizes the activists’ website as childish nonsense. ‘I doubt that anyone takes 
them too seriously.’ (Iivonen, 2007) 
The construction and installation were completed by September 2007. The mill 
started its operations November 9, 2007. See Appendix 1 for the project’s fact sheet.  
 
2008–2009: Production in Full Speed 
In early 2008, the mill was in full operation, and deliveries to customers in Europe 
and China commenced. In March, Botnia organized a music festival in Fray Bentos 
with the local authorities, and in April 2008, Botnia launched an educational, 
travelling exhibition on pulp production process in Fray Bentos. The activists 
continued their protests, insisting that they would not lift the roadblocks unless the 
mill was relocated. In July 2008, the IFC released the first environmental monitoring 
report of the pulp mill. According to the report, the mill was performing in compliance 
with the air and water quality standards required by the IFC.  
In May 2009, Botnia announced that the mill had reached its planned production and 
had produced to date more than 1,300,000 tonnes of pulp. In July 2009, Botnia 
announced the divestment of the mill to another Finnish forest industry company and 
a new focus on being the premier supplier of Finnish pulp through its Finland-based 
mills.  
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The protests and roadblocks continued through 2008 and 2009. Some of the 
protestors were disappointed that the roadblocks had no effect on the mill, while 
others feared that the removal of the roadblocks would result in the opposition fading 
from the public eye.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
This case presents a situation where a Finnish forest industry company’s investment 
project in Uruguay raised both supporting and opposing views among local 
stakeholders. From a stakeholder dialogue point of view, this case raises an 
intriguing issue: the company sought to ensure that all stakeholders were considered 
during the decision-making process and tried to inform them during the project, and 
yet it faced fierce opposition that hampered the project.  
 
Interactive, or multi-voiced, dialogue is seen as a more efficient and satisfactory 
means of communicating than ad hoc or one-way communication (Crane & Livesey, 
2003). In a conflict situation, a company could increase stakeholder involvement, 
provide stakeholders with more information on its strategic plans and operations, and 
engage in more communication with different stakeholders. Key to such 
communication is the ability to identify with stakeholders and seek an understanding 
and appreciation of their concerns.  
We conclude that stakeholder dialogue is an aspect of relationship management and 
a process where the firm and its stakeholders learn to live with multiple realities. This 
case shows how a dispute of this magnitude involves several factors, such as a 
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company’s investment policy and strategy, local and global politics. The same 
situation can be approached both as a question of foreign investment that creates 
work and wealth and as a political question in which two countries dispute with each 
other and seek international support for their views. Each construction of the situation 
builds and legitimizes the identities of different stakeholders, and, thus, also serves to 
legitimize the interests and actions of each stakeholder. The challenge for both 
academic researchers and business managers lies in developing tools and methods 
for stakeholder dialogue that can help the company to understand the multi-voiced 
nature of this dialogue and lead it to take responsibility in the process. 
 
Questions 
1. In the case introduction, Botnia, the Uruguayan government, the Argentine 
government and the environmental organization CEAG are introduced as key 
stakeholders. What interests in the case do these stakeholders have, and how 
do these interests evolve throughout the conflict? 
2. What other stakeholders are involved in the case? What are their interests and 
how do those interests change during the conflict? 
3. What kinds of arguments do the stakeholders opposing the pulp mill project 
present to support their view? How about the defensive stakeholders? What 
hopes, fears and demands do these stakeholders have as groups or 
individuals, and why?  
4. What kinds of solutions could there be to solve the conflict? Is there any room 
for a compromise? How could Botnia find a way out? What other possibilities 
are there?  
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5. Would it be possible to build a stakeholder dialogue between the company 
and the stakeholders in this case? How would you do it? 
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Appendix 1. Project fact sheet 
 
Botnia’s pulp mill project in Uruguay 
 
General  
• Location: City of Fray Bentos, Uruguay 
• Cost estimate: USD 1.2 billion 
• Capacity: 1 million tons of ECF bleached (elemental chlorine free) eucalyptus 
pulp/year 
• Investment decision made in March 2005 
• Start-up in November 2007 
 
Financing 
• Ca. 60 per cent as equity from Botnia and other stakeholders 
• Ca. 40 per cent dept financing through World Bank, export credit agencies, 
NIB and commercial banks  
 
Socioeconomic impacts in Uruguay 
• GDP estimated to increase by 1.6 per cent 
• Employment effect during construction period: max. 5.300 at the site 
• Employment effect during pulp mill operations: 3.000 direct new jobs, 5.000 
indirect new jobs 
 
Largest ever construction project in Uruguay 
• Total man-hours during construction: 15.000.000 
• Total cargo transported: 58.000 tons 
• 64 participating companies 
 
Environmental impacts 
as defined in CIS (Ecometrix) and Experts Report (Hathfield consultants) 
• No biological impacts on the Uruguay River 
• Occasional and minor local odour problems 
• No significant noise problems 
• Main impacts on traffic and landscape 
• No impacts on the present livelihoods in the area (agriculture, tourism) 
 
Machinery 
• Fibreline: ECF bleaching with hexenuronic acid removal. Lowest bleaching 
chemical consumption in the reference mills around the world.  
• Energy self-sufficiency 165 % 
 
Source: Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab, 2007 
 
 
